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PLEASANT GROVE CITY v. SUMMUM: 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH TAKES CENTER STAGE 
 
 
EDWARD J. SCHOEN 





 In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,1 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
city’s decision to display permanent monuments in a public park is a form of 
government speech, which is neither subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment, nor a form of expression to which public forum 
analysis applies.2  This unanimous and quite remarkable decision provides some 
clarity about the role government speech plays in First Amendment jurisprudence, 
but fails to define government speech or explain whether or not there are any 
limitations to governmental invocation of the doctrine. 
 The purposes of this article are to examine the development of the doctrine of 
government speech in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, to scrutinize Pleasant Grove 
carefully to ascertain whether it contributes in a meaningful way to the 
understanding of government speech, and to illustrate the difficulties created by the 
lack of a coherent definition of government speech. 
 Part I of this article will review the development of the government speech 
doctrine in U.S. Supreme Court decisions crossing a wide array of First Amendment 
expression.  Part II will carefully review Pleasant Grove and the adroit manner in 
which the Court disposed of the intersection of government speech, First 
Amendment guarantee of free speech, and the public forum analysis.  Part III will 
examine the challenges presented by the lack of a clear definition of government 
speech in resolving First Amendment issues. 
 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
 
 The source of the doctrine of government speech traces to Justice Stewart’s 
concurring opinion in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National 
                                                 
 J.D., Professor of Management, Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University, Glassboro, 
New Jersey. 
 J.D., Professor of Business Administration, Chairperson of Business Administration and 
Management Department, McGowan School of Business, King’s College, Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania. 
1 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
2 Id. at 1129. 
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Committee,3 in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that neither the First 
Amendment nor the public interest standards of the Federal Communications Act 
required broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements from the National 
Democratic Party and the Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace.4  In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Stewart observed that broadcasters should not be 
considered communication agents of the government, because to do so would strip 
them of all First Amendment protections.5  “The First Amendment,” Justice Stewart 
maintained, “protects the press from governmental interference; it confers no 
analogous protection on the government.”6  He buttressed this argument with two 
propositions: (1) “[g]overnment is not restrained by the First Amendment from 
controlling its own expression,” and (2) nothing in the First Amendment prevents the 
government from controlling its own expression or that of its agents.7  Justice 
Stewart’s observation, then, supports the generally accepted propositions that the 
First Amendment protects only private expression from government regulation, and 
that government expression is neither protected by nor restrained by the First 
Amendment.8 
 The government speech doctrine was first employed to resolve a First 
Amendment challenge in Rust v. Sullivan.9  In Rust, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected 
a First Amendment attack on regulations issued under Title X of the Public Health 
Service Act,10 which provided federal funding for family planning, but prohibited 
health care providers from counseling patients about abortions as a method of family 
planning, referring patients for abortions, or encouraging abortion as a means of 
family planning.11  These regulations attempted to separate the use of federal funding 
by family planning clinics from any abortion-related activities.12  If asked questions 
about abortions, physicians were required to give one response: Title X “does not 
consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning.”13   
Claiming these prohibitions violated their First Amendment rights, doctors and 
health care counselors challenged the facial validity of the regulations and sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief.14  The District Court rejected the constitutional 
challenge to the regulations,15 and a panel of the Second Circuit affirmed, ruling the 
government has no obligation to subsidize the exercise of speech and the health care 
                                                 
3 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973). 
4 Id. at 121, 131. 
5 Id. at 139. 
6 Id.   
7 Id. n.7. 
8 See generally David Fagundes, State Actors As First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U.L. 
REV. 1637 (2006) (exploring the limits to the conventional view and maintaining that First 
Amendment protections may be applied to government speech in some settings).   
9 Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
10 42 U.S.C. 300 – 300(a)-(6); 42 C.F.R. 59.8(a)(1) (1989). 
11 42 C.F.R. 58.8(1) and 59.10(a) (1989); Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1765. 
12 42 C.F.R. 59.9 (1989); Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1765.  
13 42 C.F.R. 59.8(b)(5) (1989). 
14 Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1766. 
15 Id.  
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workers “remain free to say whatever they wish about abortion outside the Title X 
project.”16 
 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit,17 and 
determined that restrictions on communications by health care providers and 
counselors about abortion did not violate the First Amendment.  The majority 
opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, decided that the regulations in 
question did not constitute viewpoint discrimination,18 but merely reflected the 
government’s decision to fund one program to attain certain permissible goals and 
not to fund another program which seeks to handle the problem in a different way,19 
even if the funded program discourages the attainment of the goals sought by the 
unfunded program,20 just as the government’s decision to subsidize one protected 
right does not require it to “subsidize analogous counterpart rights.”21  By upholding 
the restrictions on counseling, referral, and advocating abortion as a means of family 
planning, the Court’s decision significantly protects the right of the government to 
engage in speech when implementing a permissible governmental policy without risk 
of violating the First Amendment, because it is the government’s own speech which 
is neither restrained nor protected by the First Amendment and which trumps the 
claims of individuals that government speech violates their First Amendment rights. 
 The next major decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court addressed 
government speech was Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va. 22  In 
Rosenberger, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the University of Virginia violated 
the First Amendment by withholding payment authorization to an outside contractor 
for printing a student newspaper promoting Christian values and viewpoints.23  The 
newspaper was produced by Wide Awake Productions, a student organization 
recognized and sanctioned by the university.24  Under university guidelines, 
recognized student organizations were permitted to submit disbursement requests to 
pay outside contractors for expenses related to student news, information, and 
opinion; however, expenses related to religious activities were excluded from the 
                                                 
16 Id. at 1767. 
17 Id. at 1764.  
18 Id. at 1773. 
19 Id. “The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to 
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time 
funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.  In so 
doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen 
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other."  Id. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. In making this determination, the Court relied heavily on Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation of Wash., 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983), in which the Court ruled the Internal 
Revenue Service did not violate the First Amendment by denying tax exempt status to a 
nonprofit organization engaged in lobbying, because the government is not obligated to 
subsidize activities it does not choose to support.   
22 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
23 Id. at 845-46. 
24 Id. at 825-26. 
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disbursement request program.25 Wide Awake Publications submitted a disbursement 
request to pay its printer $5,862 for the cost of printing its newspaper,26 but the 
university denied the request because of the religious perspective of the newspaper.27 
 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the University of Virginia's refusal to pay 
the publication costs of the student newspaper because it promoted Christianity 
constituted government-imposed viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First 
Amendment.28  Having established a "limited public forum" for the expression of 
various student viewpoints through its disbursement request procedures,29 the 
university was prohibited by the First Amendment from excluding Wide Awake 
Publications because it advocated a Christian perspective.30  Furthermore, Court 
determined the use of student fees to pay publication costs for a student newspaper 
promoting a Christian perspective does not violate the Establishment Clause, because 
the university's student activities fee, unlike taxes levied for direct support of a 
church or group of churches, was "neutral toward religion."31 
 While Rosenberger determined the university’s disbursement of funds to 
support student expression was a limited public forum and upheld the students’ First 
Amendment challenge, the decision also included language strongly supportive of 
government speech free of First Amendment restraints: 
 
[W]hen the state is the speaker, it may make content-based 
choices. When the University determines the content of the 
education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have 
permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is 
not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private 
entities to convey its own message.  In the same vein, in [Rust] we 
upheld the government’s prohibition on abortion-related advice 
applicable to recipients of federal funds for family planning 
counseling.  There, the government did not create a program to 
encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to 
transmit specific information pertaining to its own program.  We 
recognized that when the government appropriates public funds to 
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it 
wishes.  When the government disburses public funds to private 
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate 
                                                 
25 Id. at 824.  A “religious activity” was defined as any activity that “primarily promotes or 
manifests a particular belief about a deity.”  Id. at 825. 
26 Id. at 827. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 828-29, 837. 
29 Id. at 829. 
30 Id. at 830-31.  "The Guideline invoked by the University to deny third-party contractor 
payments on behalf of [Wide Awake Publications] effects a sweeping restriction on student 
thought and student inquiry in the context of University sponsored publications."  Id. at 836. 
31 Id. at 840, 841. 
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and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled 
nor distorted by the grantee (citations omitted).32 
 
 In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,33 the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected a First Amendment facial challenge to criteria employed by NEA and its 
advisory panels in reviewing and selecting applications for funding.34  Congress 
implemented the criteria in 1990, when it amended the National Foundation on the 
Arts and Humanities Act35 to require that NEA funds be awarded on the basis of 
“artistic excellence and artistic merit . . . taking into consideration general standards 
of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”36  
Congress mandated the amended criteria in response to a public outcry over NEA’s 
funding a retrospective of Robert Mapplethorpe’s homoerotic photographs and 
“artist Andres Serrano’s work Piss Christ, a photograph of a crucifix immersed in 
urine.”37 
 Four artists applied for NEA funding before the revised selection criteria were 
enacted.  An advisory panel recommended approval of their projects, but the 
National Council of the Arts recommended disapproval. The NEA accepted that 
recommendation, and notified the four artists they were denied funding.38  The artists 
filed suit, requesting the restoration of funding for their proposals and challenging 
the funding criteria as impermissible viewpoint discrimination under the First 
Amendment.39 
 Initially emphasizing the “heavy burden” imposed on litigants who pursue 
facial constitutional challenges,40 the Court accepted NEA’s assurances that the 
                                                 
32 Id. at 833.  Rust and Rosenberger appear to have created an interesting polarization of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  As one commentator noted: 
 
Rosenberger has now become the standard bearer for one of two poles in 
the Court’s government speech jurisprudence.  At one pole, the Court 
says, when the government makes a decision to create a forum for 
individual speech, the government is stuck with it.  The government may 
not pick and choose among speakers because it prefers some messages 
over others.  At the opposite pole, represented by [Rust] . . . the Court says 
that the government may favor one message over another because the 
favored message is the government’s own message, and because the 
government has not created any forum for the expression of individual 
views. 
 
Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 1377, 1407 (2001). 
33 NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) 
34 Id. at 573. 
35 20 U.S.C. 954-955 (1994). 
36 20 U.S.C. 954(d)(1) (1994).  NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. at 576. 
37 NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. at 574. 
38 Id. at 577. 
39 Id. at 578. 
40 Id. at 580 (“Facial invalidation is, manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by 
the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.  To prevail, respondents must demonstrate a 
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funding criteria were merely “hortatory” and that, because no weight was accorded 
the criteria in the review process, the NEA was not restricted in selecting funded 
projects.41 Taking decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values into 
consideration, the Court insisted, does not equip the NEA with “a tool for invidious 
viewpoint discrimination.”42  Likewise, the Court noted, the decency and respect 
criteria neither silence speakers by threatening censorship nor endanger First 
Amendment values, and mere reference to the criteria is insufficient to sustain the 
artists’ burden in pursuing a facial challenge.43   
 Significantly, the Court rejected the artists’ reliance on Rosenberger as 
mandating viewpoint neutrality in awarding NEA funds because of the nature of arts 
funding.44  The Court observed that, having limited resources, the NEA must employ 
a competitive process in screening grant applications and necessarily makes content-
based judgments about the aesthetic value of the application.45  That NEA employs 
the challenged criteria in approving some applications and rejecting others does not 
constitute a violation of the First Amendment, the Court stated, because under Rust 
the decision to fund some programs and not to fund alternative programs does not 
constitute viewpoint discrimination.  By introducing Rust into the equation, the Court 
implicitly equates NEA’s decision to fund some projects and reject funding for 
others as government speech employed in the implementation of permissible 
governmental policy that is insulated from First Amendment challenge.  While it is 
not clear what message the government seeks to communicate in selecting some 
applications for funding and rejecting others, it is nonetheless government speech,46 
which trumps the First Amendment interests of the objecting artists. 
 In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 47 
the U.S. Supreme Court again confronted the government speech/public forum 
dichotomy.  In Southworth, students enrolled in the University of Wisconsin objected 
to paying a mandatory, nonrefundable student services fee that was used in part to 
support extracurricular student speech with which they disagreed, and, relying on 
cases restricting the use of mandatory union dues and bar association fees for 
ideological purposes to which members objected,48 insisted that they be given the 
choice not to fund student activities involving political and ideological expression 
offensive to their personal beliefs.49  The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and decided 
that the “First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an 
activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the 
                                                                                                                   
substantial risk that application of the provision will lead to the suppression of speech.”) 
(citations omitted) 
41 Id. at 580-81. 
42 Id. at 582. 
43 Id. at 583. 
44 Id. at 586.  
45 Id.  
46 See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 32, at 1457-62. 
47 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
48 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1762 (1977), and Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 110 S. 
Ct. 2228 (1990). 
49 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 220-221, 227. 
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program is viewpoint neutral.”50  The Court also determined, however, that the 
“student referendum mechanism” employed by the University to allocate the student 
fees might violate the “viewpoint neutrality principle,” and remanded the matter for 
further proceedings.51 
 In reaching its decision, the Court preliminarily addressed the issue of 
government speech when it determined the speech in question was not the speech of 
the University.52  The court noted that the government may, without violating the 
First Amendment, levy taxes and impose mandatory fees to support its speech, 
stating:   
 
It is inevitable that government will adopt and pursue programs 
and policies within its constitutional powers but which 
nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and sincere 
convictions of some of its citizens.  The government, as a general 
rule, may support valid programs and policies by taxes or other 
exactions binding on protesting parties.  Within this broader 
principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government 
will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and 
defend its own policies.53 
 
 Just as Rosenberger determined that the University of Virginia’s funding of 
student expression constituted a public forum and that the university violated the 
principle of viewpoint neutrality in declining to fund the newspaper promoting 
Christianity, Southworth found that the University of Wisconsin’s funding of student 
organization expression constituted a public forum requiring viewpoint neutrality in 
its administration and that the procedure employed to approve the allocations may 
have violated that principle.  Likewise, both Rosenberger and Southworth contain 
dicta supportive of the doctrine of government speech. Unlike Rosenberger’s 
upholding the students’ First Amendment claim for funding for their publication, 
however, Southworth rejected the students’ First Amendment claim for a refund of 
                                                 
50 Id. at 221, 223 (“When a university requires its students to pay fees to support the 
extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer 
some viewpoints to others . . . .  Viewpoint neutrality is the justification for requiring the 
student to pay the fee in the first instance and for ensuring the integrity of the program's 
operation once the funds have been collected.”). 
51 Id. 221, 235 (“[I]t appears that by majority vote of the student body a given RSO may be 
funded or defunded.  It is unclear to us what protection, if any, there is for viewpoint neutrality 
in this part of the process.  To the extent the referendum substitutes majority determinations 
for viewpoint neutrality it would undermine the constitutional protection the program requires.  
The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same 
respect as are majority views.  Access to a public forum, for instance, does not depend upon 
majoritarian consent.  That principle is controlling here.  A remand is necessary and 
appropriate to resolve this point; and the case in all events must be reexamined in light of the 
principles we have discussed.”) 
52 Id. at 229. 
53 Id.   
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student fees used to support student organization expression with which they 
disagreed. 
 In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n,54 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a 
mandatory assessment of one dollar per head of cattle sold or imported to finance 
market and food science research into the nutritional value of beef and promotional 
campaigns to market beef domestically and overseas.55  Two beef producer 
associations and several beef ranchers objected to the assessment because the 
promotional campaigns focused on beef as a generic product which impeded their 
efforts to promote the superiority of American beef, grain-fed beef, or certified 
Angus or Hereford beef.56  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that U.S. Department of 
Agriculture did not violate the First Amendment rights of beef producers and 
ranchers by requiring them to contribute funds to support generic advertisements for 
beef,57 because the generic advertisements in question constituted the Government's 
own speech.58  The Court reasoned that, by enacting and implementing the beef 
marketing program, Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture authored, controlled, 
and disseminated the message of the beef promotional program in its entirety.59  
Hence, the doctrine of government speech applied and eviscerated the beef 
producers' First Amendment objections to the beef assessment program.60  Quite 
simply, the generic advertisements in question constituted the Government's own 
speech,61 and the beef producers and ranchers have no First Amendment right against 
compelled financing of government speech,62 just as other “[citizens] have no First 
Amendment right not to fund government speech.”63  
 Livestock Marketing falls squarely into the Rust camp.  Having determined the 
expression in question constitutes government speech, the government’s expression 
cannot be restrained by other First Amendment considerations and trumps the 
competing First Amendment claims of those objecting to the government speech.  
Rust restricted health care counselors from discussing abortion with their clients as a 
means of family planning and required the counselors to eschew abortion as an 
appropriate method of family planning.  Because those restrictions constituted 
government speech, they trumped the competing First Amendment claims of the 
health care counselors. Similarly Livestock Marketing upheld mandatory 
contributions to beef promotional campaigns and forced those beef producers to be 
associated with marketing promotions to which they objected. Because the 
government’s beef marketing program constituted government speech, it trumped the 
compelled speech claims of the beef producers. 
                                                 
54 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005). 
55 Id. at 2059, 2066. 
56 Id. at 2060. 
57 Id. at 2066. 
58 Id. at 2058 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 2066 
61 Id. at 2058 
62 Id. at 2066.  See United States v. American Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 211-12 
(2003) (requiring public libraries receiving federal funding to install internet filtering software 
to block obscene material does not violate the First Amendment). 
63 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2064. 
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 In Garcetti v. Ceballos,64 Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attorney in the 
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office was advised by a defense attorney 
that he would file a motion to challenge a search warrant, because inaccuracies 
appeared in an affidavit submitted to obtain a search warrant.65  Ceballos reviewed 
the affidavit, inspected the location it described, and determined that the warrant 
contained serious misrepresentations.66  Ceballos subsequently spoke to the deputy 
sheriff whose averments appeared in the affidavit, and was not satisfied with the 
explanations provided.67  Ceballos notified his supervisors of his concerns and 
drafted a memorandum in which he recommended that criminal charges in a case be 
dropped, because he suspected the deputy sheriff’s averments used to obtain a search 
warrant were untrue.68  Ceballos’ superiors rejected his advice, and decided to move 
ahead with the case pending the outcome of defense counsel’s motion challenging 
the search warrant.69  During the hearing on the motion to challenge the warrant, 
Ceballos provided testimony favorable to the defendant, but the court rejected the 
challenge to the warrant.70  Ceballos contended that the District Attorney’s office 
subsequently engaged in retaliatory conduct for his testifying at the hearing by 
demoting him to a trial deputy position, transferring him to another courthouse, and 
denying him a promotion.71  Ceballos then pursued a claim for lost wages and 
compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for adverse employment actions 
committed in retaliation for his engagement in speech protected by the First 
Amendment.72   
 Ruling that Ceballos was not entitled to First Amendment protection for the 
contents of the memorandum, because he wrote his memorandum as part of his 
official duties, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants.73  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, deciding that Ceballos’ 
actions constituted protected speech under the First Amendment, even though the 
speech in question was expressed pursuant to his duties of employment.74  
 The U.S.Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, ruling that “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 
insulate their communications from employer discipline.”75 In reaching this decision, 
the Court emphasized that the government as employer can exert control over the 
                                                 
64 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
65 Id. at 1955.   
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id.   
71 Id. at 1956.   
72 Id.   
73 Id.   
74 Id.   
75 Id. at 1960. 
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speech the government “has commissioned or created.”76  In other words, 
government funded speech is the equivalent of government speech and government 
speech is not protected by the First Amendment.77  Hence, because Ceballos’ speech 
was required as part of his job responsibilities as a prosecuting attorney and because 
Ceballos’ salary was paid by a government agency, he engaged in government 
speech and cannot claim First Amendment protection.78 
 Like Finley and Livestock Marketing, Garcetti falls into the Rust camp.  Once 
the court determined that the expression in question is government speech, it cannot 
be restricted by First Amendment considerations and trumped competing First 
Amendment claims.  The marketing program in Livestock Marketing was deemed to 
be government speech, because Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture authored, 
controlled, and disseminated the message of the beef promotional program in its 
entirety.  It did not matter that it was funded by a mandatory assessment on each 
head of cattle sold, because, as noted in Rosenberger, the government may 
appropriate funds to convey its message, and, as noted in Southworth, the 
government may generate support for it programs by levying taxes on protesting 
parties.  Having determined the beef marketing program was government speech, it 
trumped the competing First Amendment claims of the beef producers. 
 Similarly, the speech in Garcetti constituted government speech, because the 
assistant district attorney conveyed his message as part of his duties as a government 
employee and because the government paid his salary for performing those 
responsibilities. Having determined Ceballos communications were government 
speech, that speech trumped the competing First Amendment claims of Ceballos. 
                                                 
76 Id. citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) 
(“When the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it 
is entitled to say what it wishes.”) 
77 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 (“funds raised by 
the government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own 
policies”).  Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2062 (“'Compelled support of 
government' -- even those programs of government one does not approve of -- is of course 
perfectly constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest.  And some government programs 
involve, or entirely consist of, advocating a position.  'The government, as a general rule, may 
support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties.  
Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be 
spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own policies.'  We have 
generally assumed, though not yet squarely held, that compelled funding of government 
speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns.”).  Legal Serv. Corp. v. Valasquez, 
531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in 
which the government is itself the speaker”).  U.S.v. Am.Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 211-
12 (requiring public libraries receiving federal funding to install internet filtering software to 
block obscene material does not violate the First Amendment). 
78 In contrast, in Legal Serv. Corp. v. Valasquez, 531 U.S. at 542, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that an attorney employed by Legal Services engages in private speech when advocating 
on behalf of an indigent client.  Hence, government restrictions prohibiting legal services 
attorneys from challenging the validity of welfare laws infringed on private speech subsidized 
by the government, and public forum analysis applied.  The legal services attorney’s advocacy 
was not deemed to be government speech. 
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 From its humble beginnings as an explanatory comment in a concurring 
opinion, the doctrine of government speech has emerged as a necessary and powerful 
tool helping governments govern and coincidentally squelching First Amendment 
objections to those governing processes. It is a relatively new theory, which, because 
its meaning and limitations have not been defined, and can be both scary and elusive. 
 
II. PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM 
 The City of Pleasant Grove, Utah, maintained a two and one half acre park 
called “Pioneer Park” containing fifteen permanent displays, eleven of which were 
donated by private groups.79  The displays were quite varied, and included “an 
historic granary, a wishing well, the City's first fire station, a September 11 
monument, and a Ten Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal Order of 
Eagles in 1971.”80 Summum, “a religious organization founded in 1975 and 
headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah,” made three separate requests for the 
permission of Pleasant Grove City to install a monument containing the “Seven 
Aphorisms” of Summum and designed to look similar to the Ten Commandments 
monument.81  Pleasant Grove City denied the requests, explaining that it limited 
monuments to those that directly related to its history or were donated by groups 
with longstanding ties to the community.82 
 Summum filed an action in federal district court, claiming Pleasant Grove 
City violated its First Amendment Rights by displaying the Ten Commandments 
monument but refusing to accept the Seven Aphorisms monument, and seeking 
injunctive relief directing Pleasant Grove City to permit Summum to erect its 
monument in Pioneer Park.83  The district court denied Summum’s request for an 
injunction, and Summum appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.84  
Applying public forum analysis, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court.85  
                                                 
79 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129. 
80 Id.  
81 Id.  "The Summum church incorporates elements of Gnostic Christianity, teaching that 
spiritual knowledge is experiential and that through devotion comes revelation, which 
modifies human perceptions, and transfigures the individual.  See The Teachings of Summum 
are the Teachings of Gnostic Christianity, 
http://www.summum.us/philosophy/gnosticism.shtml (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).  Central to 
Summum religious belief and practice are the Seven Principles of Creation (the ‘Seven 
Aphorisms’), http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).  
According to Summum doctrine, the Seven Aphorisms were inscribed on the original tablets 
handed down by God to Moses on Mount Sinai. . . . Because Moses believed that the Israelites 
were not ready to receive the Aphorisms, he shared them only with a select group of people.  
In the Summum Exodus account, Moses then destroyed the original tablets, traveled back to 
Mount Sinai, and returned with a second set of tablets containing the Ten Commandments.  
See The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten Commandments, 
http://www.summum.us/philosophy/tencommandments.shtml (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).  Id. 
at n. 1 (quoting from the Respondent’s brief). 
82 Id. at 1130.  
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
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Having previously ruled that the Ten Commandments display in Pioneer Park was 
private not government speech,86 and declaring Pioneer Park to be a public forum, 
the Ninth Circuit determined that Pleasant Grove City could not reject the Seven 
Aphorisms display without a compelling justification that could not be attained by 
more narrowly tailored means.87  Concluding the denial of Summum’s request to 
display its monument could not survive the strict scrutiny test, the panel directed 
Pleasant Grove City to allow Summum to erect its monument immediately.88  
 The U.S. Supreme Court began its analysis by describing the role and 
importance of government speech and explaining why the First Amendment does not 
regulate or restrict government speech.  Without government speech, the Court 
observed, the government could not function,89 debate and discussion of “issues of 
great concern to the public” would be confined to the private sector, and the process 
of government would be “radically transformed.” 90  In short, without government 
speech, the public would have no understanding of what the government seeks to 
accomplish and why.  In order to preserve the government’s right to engage in 
speech, the First Amendment cannot be permitted to limit government speech.91  
Otherwise, the government could be restrained by a “First Amendment heckler” 
from expressing its views, and thereby prevented from informing society about the 
policies it seeks to adopt or opposes and indeed how it governs.92  In other words, in 
the absence of protected government speech, the government cannot govern.93  
Further, the Court emphasized, given the critical importance of government speech, 
it should make no difference whether the delivery of a “government controlled 
message” is facilitated by private sources and resources.94 
 Having underscored the importance of government speech, the Court 
addressed the public forum implications of Pleasant Grove City’s refusal to permit 
the erection of the Summum monument.  Observing that, because public streets and 
parks have traditionally been used for citizens’ assembly, debate, and discussion, the 
government’s right to restrict such speech in those locations is significantly 
restrained.95  Government restrictions of speech in these traditional public forums are 
unconstitutional, unless they meet the strict scrutiny test, under which the restriction 
must be narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling government interest.96  While 
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions are permitted, restrictions based on 
                                                 
86 Id. citing Summum v. Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002). 
87 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1130. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 1131. 
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.   
93 Id. (“Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this 
freedom.”). 
94 Id. (“A government entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views when it 
receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering a government controlled 
message.  [The government] is not precluded from relying on the government speech doctrine 
merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources.”) (citations omitted). 
95 Id. at 1132. 
96 Id.  
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viewpoint are not.97  These same restrictions on government regulation of speech 
also apply to government property, which, while not traditionally considered to be a 
public forum, has been designated or permitted to serve as public forum.98  
 Recognizing the First Amendment intersection of government speech and 
public forum presented by Summum’s application to display its monument, the U.S. 
Supreme Court quickly concluded that, although it is sometimes difficult to 
determine “whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing 
a forum for private speech,” “[p]ermanent monuments displayed on public property 
typically represent government speech.”99  It explained: 
 
Governments have long used monuments to speak to the public.  
Since ancient times, kings, emperors, and other rulers have erected 
statutes of themselves to remind their subjects of their authority 
and power. Triumphal arches, columns, and other monuments have 
been built to commemorate military victories and sacrifices and 
other events of civic importance.  A monument, by definition, is a 
structure that is designed as a means of expression.  When a 
government entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it 
does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some 
feeling in those who see the structure.100   
 
 Moreover, the government’s acceptance and display of “privately financed 
and donated monuments . . . on government land” are readily recognized by 
observers as government speech,101 and throughout the Nation’s history “a great 
many” monuments “financed by private funds or donated by private parties” have 
adorned federal and state parks, permitting the government to acquire monuments 
they otherwise could not have afforded,102 while exercising the right to determine 
what monuments will be displayed, what locations are appropriate, and what identity 
or message the government seeks to convey.103 
 So too Pleasant Grove City uses selected monuments to define and control the 
identity and image it seeks to convey to Pioneer Park visitors, city residents and the 
outside world, and in that process engages in government speech.104  Further, 
Pleasant Grove City can do so without engaging in the process advocated by 
Summum of identifying, embracing and proclaiming the message it seeks to 
convey.105  On the contrary, the city’s display of a monument conveys a message and 
that message is not necessarily a single or simple message, but may be interpreted or 
                                                 
97 Id.   
98 Id.   
99 Id.   
100 Id. at 1132-33. 
101 Id. at 1133. 
102 Id.   
103 Id. 1133-34 
104 Id. at 1134. 
105 Id. at 1134-35.  The Court rejected Summum’s argument that the city’s message cannot 
qualify as government speech unless the city expressly and formally define, articulate and 
endorse the meaning it seeks to convey.  
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understood by observers in multiple ways, just as the display of “the Greco-Roman 
mosaic of the word ‘Imagine’ that was donated to New York City's Central Park in 
memory of John Lennon” encourages observers to imagine his music if he had not 
been killed or perhaps to recall the lyrics of the Lennon song or possibly to picture 
the world as described in the lyrics.106  In displaying the selected monument, the city 
neither endorses the multiple interpretations people can take from the display nor 
yields the right to alter its message by changing the display or adding subsequent 
monuments.107  Indeed, because the meaning attributed to a monument can also 
change over time, requiring the government to declare its message may mandate a 
futile exercise.108 
 Returning to the collision between government speech exercised by Pleasant 
Grove City and the public forum analysis advocated by Summum, the Court aptly 
described the important differences between transitory messages delivered, and 
permanent monuments displayed, in government parks.  In the former situation, 
“government-owned property or a government program [is] capable of 
accommodating a large number of public speakers without defeating the essential 
function of the land or the program.”109  In the latter situation, because of the 
permanency of monuments and limitations of physical space, public land can 
accommodate only a fixed number of monuments.  As the court explained: 
 
Speakers, no matter how long-winded, eventually come to the end 
of their remarks; persons distributing leaflets and carrying signs at 
some point tire and go home; monuments, however, endure.  They 
monopolize the use of the land on which they stand and interfere 
permanently with other uses of public space.  A public park, over 
the years, can provide a soapbox for a very large number of 
orators--often, for all who want to speak--but it is hard to imagine 
how a public park could be opened up for the installation of 
permanent monuments by every person or group wishing to engage 
in that form of expression.110 
                                                 
106 Id. at 1135.  The Court quoted the lyrics as follows: “Imagine there's no heaven It's easy if 
you try No hell below us Above us only sky Imagine all the people Living for today . . . 
Imagine there's no countries It isn't hard to do Nothing to kill or die for And no religion too 
Imagine all the people Living life in peace . . . You may say I'm a dreamer But I'm not the 
only one I hope someday you'll join us And the world will be as one Imagine no possessions I 
wonder if you can No need for greed or hunger A brotherhood of man Imagine all the people 
Sharing all the world . . . You may say I'm a dreamer But I'm not the only one I hope someday 
you'll join us And the world will live as one. J. Lennon, Imagine, on Imagine (Apple Records 
1971).”  Id. at n.2. 
107 Id. at 1136. 
108 Id. at 1136-37. 
109 Id. at 1137.  The examples used by the Court to make the point are the enormous number of 
speeches, parades and demonstrations that can be accommodated in public parks over time, 
the multiplicity of activities and speakers that can be provided through student activity fees, 
and the plethora of messages that can be conveyed by the internal communication facilities of 
a school system. 
110 Id.   
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 Nor, the Court emphasized, can the issue be resolved by “content-neutral time, 
place and manner restrictions, including the option of a ban on all unattended 
displays,” as advocated by Summum.111  Otherwise, the Court explained,  
 
[W]hen France presented the Statute of Liberty to the United States 
in 1884, the United States has the option of either (a) declining 
France’s offer or (b) accepting the gift, but providing a comparable 
location in the harbor of New York for other statues of a similar 
size and nature (e.g., a Statute of Autocracy, if one had been 
offered by, say, the German Empire or Imperial Russia).112 
 
 Indeed, the Court noted, compelling Pleasant Grove City to apply public 
forum analysis to public display of monuments would surely result in “an influx of 
clutter” or the removal of “longstanding and cherished monuments” and, ultimately, 
the refusal to accept any donations of public monuments.113  Surely, the Court 
concluded, “where the application of forum analysis would lead almost inexorably to 
closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out of place.”114   
 Having concluded that the decision of Pleasant Grove City not to display the 
Summum monument was government speech and that public forum analysis did not 
apply to Pioneer Park, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of 
Appeals.115  In doing so, the Court accentuates three government speech principles: 
(1) government speech is a critically important tool that shapes debate and discussion 
of public issues and informs the public of what the government seeks to accomplish 
and why; (2) the government engages in speech when it permits the display of 
monuments whether donated or purchased on public property without any 
requirement that the government endorse the message the display evokes; and (3) the 
government’s display of monuments does not create a public forum in which its role 
is restricted to administering content-neutral “time, place, and manner” restrictions. 
 
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
 The above noted discussion of U.S. Supreme Court decisions underscores the 
major challenge in understanding how the government speech doctrine will be 
employed in First Amendment cases: creating a cohesive definition of government 
speech.  First, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that disparate types of speech 
qualify as government speech: restricting health care counselors from suggesting 
abortion in discussing family planning (Rust); selecting artists’ grant applications for 
funding (Finley); compelling beef producers to subsidize a marketing program to 
which they objected (Livestock Marketing); an assistant district attorney’s testimony 
and statements prepared in the course of his employment (Ceballos); and selecting 
                                                 
111 Id. at 1137-38. 
112 Id. at 1138. 
113 Id.   
114 Id.   
115 Id.   
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monuments for display in Pioneer Park (Pleasant Grove).  Hence government speech 
cannot be defined on the basis of the content of the speech. 
 Similarly, government speech does not depend its source.  In Rust, the source 
was administrative regulation permitting the government to select one program over 
another to achieve it policy objective.  In Finley, the source was a statute altering the 
criteria employed in the selection and funding of grant applications.  In Livestock 
Marketing, the source was a statutorily-based, self-contained, government-sponsored 
program to promote the marketing of beef. In Ceballos, the source was a government 
employee attempting to fulfill his employment responsibilities.  In Pleasant Grove, 
the source was the decision of the city to accept monuments for display in a public 
park.  Hence the source of the speech cannot be said to dictate what constitutes 
government speech. 
 Nor does government speech depend on the purpose of the speech.  In Rust, 
the government did not want its family planning programs linked to the availability 
of abortion as a means of family planning.  In Finley, the government did not want to 
be associated with the funding of indecent art.  In Livestock Marketing, the 
government wanted to promote the sales of beef products.  In Ceballos, the 
government wanted to withhold information about its litigation strategy and 
weaknesses.  In Pleasant Grove, the city wanted to create an image for the visitors to 
Pioneer Park. 
 Moreover, while the extensive degree of direct editorial control over the 
government’s message was an important factor in determining the beef marketing 
program in Livestock Marketing was government speech, the degree of editorial 
control and its impact in making the expression government speech was not a factor 
in the other decisions.  Indeed, as the Court stated in Pleasant Grove, government 
expression may qualify as government speech even if the government agency does 
not formally define, articulate or endorse the meaning it seeks to convey.116 
 Hence there is a significant void in understanding the application and 
limitations of the government speech doctrine.  Legal scholars have recommended 
different approaches to assess what constitutes government speech.  Professors 
Benzanson and Buss identify intent and effect as important considerations in 
defining government speech: “purposeful action by government, expressing its own 
distinct message, which is understood by those who receive it to be government’s 
message.”117  Professor Gielow Jacobs recommends that accountability for speaking, 
the existence of an identifiable and constitutionally valid message, and the non-
speech-suppressing impact of the message should constitute the framework for 
determining the existence of government speech.118  Professor Gia Lee identifies 
transparency as the key element in defining government speech, so that “a reasonable 
recipient understands that the government bears responsibility for a 
communication.”119  Professor Helen Norton identifies the government’s role as the 
                                                 
116 Id. at 1134-35.   
117 Bezanson &Buss, supra note 32, at 1384. 
118 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35, 113 (2002). 
119 Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 
992 (2005). 
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formal and functional source of the message is the key element in identifying 
government speech.120 
 The lack of a cohesive definition of what constitutes government speech has 
caused confusion in the lower courts over what is government speech and what is 
private speech in a public forum.121  In ACLU v. Bredesen,122 the Sixth Circuit 
upheld a Tennessee decision to issue a “choose life” specialty license plate and reject 
the request for a “pro-choice” license plate as a valid exercise of government 
speech.123  Tennessee issued the “choose life” license plates pursuant to a statute 
authorizing the state to share the sales proceeds with New Life Resources, Inc., 
which designed and promoted sales of the plate.124  New Life Resources’ share of the 
profits were dedicated to providing counseling, medical and financial support to 
pregnant women, and the state’s share was split between the Tennessee arts 
commission and highway fund.125  Pro choice proponents lobbied for the passage of 
a statute authorizing the issuance of “pro choice” specialty plates, but that measure 
was defeated.126  The American Civil Liberties Union filed suit on behalf of pro 
choice organizations challenging the constitutionality of the program under the First 
Amendment.127  The court held that Tennessee’s issuance of specialty license plates, 
even though facilitated by private volunteers, did not create a public forum and did 
not require content neutrality.128 
 In contrast, in Planned Parenthood of South Carolina v. Rose,129 the Fourth 
Circuit concluded the same license plates constituted a mixture of government and 
private expression,130 and upheld a Planned Parenthood’s First Amendment 
challenge to South Carolina’s issuance of a “choose life” but not a “pro-choice” 
license plate.131  The court determined that the statute authorizing the pro life 
specialty plates was adopted because of the State’s agreement with the pro-life 
message,132 and, by promoting the pro life viewpoint over the pro choice viewpoint, 
improperly engaged in viewpoint discrimination.”133  Fearing that the application of 
the government speech doctrine to mixed private and government speech would 
                                                 
120 Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 
B.U. L. Rev. 587, 631 (2008). 
121 See Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1 (2007). 
122 ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006). 
123 Id. at 371. 
124 Id. at 372. 
125 Id.  
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 375-79. 
129 Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004). 
130 Id. at 794.  The court applied a four-factor test in reaching this conclusion: “(1) the central 
purpose of the program in which the speech in question occurs; (2) the degree of editorial 
control exercised by the government or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the 
identity of the literal speaker; and (4) whether the government or the private entity bears the 
ultimate responsibility for the content of the speech."  Id. at 792-93. 
131 Id at 799. 
132 Id. at 795. 
133 Id. 
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constitute an “unwarranted extension of the government speech doctrine and of the 
State’s power to promote some viewpoints above others,”134 and concluding the 
state’s engagement in specialty license plate promotions constituted a limited public 
forum,135 the court ruled that South Carolina’s promotion of the pro-life specialty 
license plate violated the First Amendment.136  
 In Robb v. Hungerbeeler,137 the Eighth Circuit held that the refusal of 
Missouri to recognize a Missouri chapter of the Klu Klux Klan as a sponsor in the 
state’s Adopt-a-Highway program and to erect a sign acknowledging the chapter’s 
participation in the program violated the First Amendment.138  Missouri refused to 
admit the chapter to the program, because the statute prohibited participation by any 
organization with a “history of violence,” and the chapter is associated with similar 
organizations found to have a history of violence.139  The court ruled that the 
regulation was unconstitutionally broad, and conceivably could be used to bar 
football and hockey teams and labor unions which previously engaged in heated 
labor disputes from participation.140  Agreeing with the district court that Missouri’s 
Adopt-a- Highway was a limited public forum,141 the Eighth Circuit concluded that 
the criteria for participation permitted the state to engage in viewpoint 
discrimination, and rejected the state’s argument that the program was government 
speech.142   
 In contrast, in Knights of the Klu Klux Klan v. Curators of the University of 
Missouri,143 the Eighth Circuit decided that the University of Missouri’s public radio 
station did not have to accept and acknowledge financial support from the Klan 
under the First Amendment, because the station's underwriting acknowledgments 
were government speech.144 The court noted that public forum analysis was 
inapplicable to public broadcasting, because “substantial discretion is accorded to 
broadcasters with respect to the daily operation of their stations,”145 and that, because 
the radio station was required by law to advise its listeners the source of funds 
contributed to support its broadcasts, those public announcements were government 
speech.146 
In a similar vein, the federal district court in South Carolina court upheld a public 
school district’s refusal to include pro-voucher promotional materials on the 
district’s webpage, which conveyed the school board’s opposition to voucher 
                                                 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 788. 
136 Id. at 799. 
137 Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2004). 
138 Id. at737-38. 
139 Id. at 741-42. 
140 Id. at 742. 
141 Id. at 743. 
142 Id. at 744. 
143 Knights of the Klu Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 
2000). 
144 Id. at 1091-96 (8th Cir. 2000). 
145 Id. at 1093. 
146 Id.  
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programs.147 The court concluded, “[i]t is beyond doubt that the District's 
communication of its own position, as stated in its own words, is government speech, 
regardless of whether that communication was disseminated through its website, 
email network or newsletters.”148  The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the 
inclusion of links on the school district’s website to other websites and private 
parties’ statements did not created a limited public forum, because the defendant 
retained sole control over its message when it decided what links and private party 
messages to include.  Thus, the school district’s speech was government speech and 
not a limited public forum which plaintiff was entitled to access.149 
 In contrast, in Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun 
County Library,150 the federal district court ruled that the public library created a 
limited public forum when it provided access to the internet through its computers to 
members of the public.151  In reaching its decision, the court considered three factors: 
government intent, government designation, and the nature of the forum.  Because 
the county government intended to create a public forum when it authorized its 
public library system and designated the library for the use of the public, and because 
the internet is compatible with facilitating expressive communication, the court 
determined that public library access to the internet constituted a limited public 
forum.152   
 The above described confusion in the lower courts as to what is government 
speech, mixed private and government speech, or private speech in a public forum 
underscores the need for a coherent definition of government speech.  As Professor 
Helen Norton noted, “[c]onflicts like these illustrate the need for a coherent 
government speech doctrine that parses the government’s impermissible censorship 
of private speech from its own legitimate expressive interests.”153   
 Even more worrisome, the lack of a cohesive definition of government speech 
has triggered the application of the government speech doctrine to faculty members 
in public supported universities.  While the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Ceballos 
that the government speech doctrine may have an effect on academic freedom and 
declined to indicate how the doctrine would affect scholarship or teaching,154 lower 
                                                 
147 Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3886 (2007). 
148 Id. at 54. 
149 Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist., 531 F.3d 275, 283-285 (2008).  Accord, AFSCME v. 
Maricopa County, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18356 (U.S.D.C. AZ 2007), and Sutliffe v. Epping 
Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314 (1st Cir. 2009). 
150 Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Tr. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 
(1998). 
151 Id. at 563. 
152 Id.  Contra, Crosby v. S. Orange Cmty. Coll. District, 172 Ca. App. 4th 433, 443 (2009) 
(because the county college did not intend to provide public access to the internet through its 
library computers, the library computers were not deemed to be a designated public forum). 
153 Norton, supra note 120, at 591. 
154 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1962 (“There is some argument that expression related to 
academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests 
that are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We 
need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would 
apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”). 
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courts have applied Ceballos to university professors.  In Renken v. Gregory,155 
Kevin Renken, a tenured Professor of Engineering, claimed the University of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee reduced his pay and terminated his National Science 
Foundation (NSF) grant in retaliation for his exercising his First Amendment rights 
in complaining about the University’s use of NSF grant funds.  Professor Renken 
pursued an action against the University under 43 U.S.C. § 1983.156  Concluding 
Renken’s comments were made as part of his official duties as a professor rather 
than as a private citizen, the district court granted the University’s motion for 
summary judgment.157  The Sixth Circuit agreed, ruling that, because Renken 
complained about the University’s use of the NSF funds “pursuant to his official 
duties as a University professor, his speech was not shielded by the First 
Amendment.”158  
 Similarly, in Gorum v. Sessoms,159 Allen Sessoms, the president of Delaware 
State University, fired a tenured professor, Wendell Gorum, for improperly changing 
forty-eight students’ failing grades to passing grades.160  Professor Gorum pursued an 
action against the University for wrongful dismissal, claiming that the University 
committee which investigated the matter recommended he be suspended not 
dismissed and that the university president acted in retaliation for his exercise of his 
First Amendment rights in voicing opposition to Sessoms’ selection as president, in 
objecting to disciplinary action taken against a student athlete, and in rescinding the 
invitation to Sessoms to address a fraternity’s Martin Luther King, Jr. Prayer 
Breakfast.161  The district court rejected Gorum’s claims, concluding his three 
speech-related claims occurred within the scope of his duties as a university 
professor and were not protected by the First Amendment.162  The Third Circuit 
affirmed, ruling the speech in question was undertaken as part of his professional 
duties rather than as a private citizen, and hence was not protected by the First 
Amendment.163  
                                                 
155 Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008).  See Peter Schmidt, Professors’ 
Freedoms Under Assault in the Courts, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., February 27, 2009, p. A1, 
available at 
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v55/i25/25a00103.htm?utm_source=at&utm_medium=en.  
156 Renken, 541 F.3d at 770. 
157 Id. at 773. 
158 Id. at 775.   In Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2000), professors employed 
by public colleges and universities in Virginia challenged a Virginia statute prohibiting state 
employees access to sexually explicit material on the grounds it violated their First 
Amendment rights.  The Fourth Circuit ruled the regulation of state employees' access to 
sexually explicit material  in their capacity as employees on computers owned or leased by the 
state is consistent with the First Amendment, because it did not affect the professors’ rights as 
private citizens, but regulated their conduct as government employees. Id. 
159 Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3rd Cir. 2009). 
160 Id. at 183.  
161 Id. at 183-184. 
162 Id. at 184. 
163 Id. at 186.  See Peter Schmidt, Court Broadly Defines Job-Related Speech in Upholding 
Delaware Professor’s Dismissal, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 30, 2009, available at 
http://chronicle.com/daily/2009/03/14677n.htm?utm_source=at&utm_medium=en. 
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 As a consequence of these decisions, the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) initiated a campaign to protect the academic freedom in public 
colleges and universities and to promote the adoption of “policies broadly protecting 
faculty speech dealing with academic matters, institutional governance, teaching, 
research, and issues outside the workplace.”164  The AAUP also issued a report 
expressing alarm at recent federal court decisions which ominously threaten 
academic freedom and insisting on the restoration of the deference traditionally 




 While Pleasant Grove enhances our understanding of the role of government 
speech by upholding the right of city officials to accept donations of monuments for 
display in public parks and thereby craft the image they wish to present to the 
visiting public without fear of violating the First Amendment, the Pleasant Grove 
decision, like its antecedents, fails to address the critically important need to craft a 
workable definition of government speech.  Even though the development of the 
government speech doctrine in First Amendment cases is in its infancy, the difficulty 
in distinguishing between private and government speech, between the government’s 
establishment of public speech forums and the government’s engagement in 
communicating its own speech, and between those situations in which the 
government must maintain viewpoint neutrality or may engage in its own 
propaganda, points to the need to focus judicial attention on the development of a 
more cohesive definition of government speech.   
 What is clear is that, when invoked, government speech trumps competing 
First Amendment claims, freeing the government to pursue the art of governing by 
                                                 
164 Peter Schmidt, AAUP Announces Effort to Shore Up Academic Freedom at Public 
Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 10, 2009, available at 
http://chronicle.com/article/AAUP-Announces-Effort-to-
Shore/49100/?sid=at&utm_source=at&utm_medium=en. 
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informing the public of what it seeks to accomplish and why.  What is far less clear 
is exactly what constitutes government speech. While legal scholars have 
recommended that factors such as authorship, purpose, nature, speaker identity, and 
control are determinative in deciding whether or not the speech in question is 
government speech, it is unclear which of those factors should be applied and the 
weight to be accorded them.  Because these issues are unresolved, lower courts 
struggle to resolve what qualifies as government speech.  Even more ominously, 
lower courts have begun to apply the doctrine of government speech to university 
professors by determining that their publicly stated criticisms of the university are 
undertaken as part of their official duties as state employees and do not constitute 
private speech under the First Amendment.  None of the lower court decisions 
discussed above having been appealed, time and future litigation may tell. 
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